Why kazakhs look asian

It is mostly Kazakh nationals who travel by bus or by train to Khorgos from Almaty and smaller towns to benefit from cheap Chinese goods sold tax-free in this zone. Every day, 4, Kazakhs and 15, Chinese traders and shoppers enter the zone, but there is a massive unbalance between the small Kazakh town and the Chinese city on the other side of ICBC.

In Kazakhstan, there is a clear veil of reticence towards the Chinese embrace. It is due to a mix of popular ignorance no one knows exactly how many Chinese live in Kazakhstan and disinformation.

Although there have been few public surveys on the issue, experts and officials during conversations report a palpable anxiety on the part of the locals. The second is that China will start questioning the border agreements and suddenly demand more land.

The later concern became obvious when Kazakhstan experienced unexpected protests sparked by proposed amendments to the Land Law adopted in that were to enter into force in June The changes would have allowed foreigners to rent agricultural land for 25 years instead of 10 previously.

In Kazakhstan, some say these changes to the law — which were perceived as allowing China to control lands — were not the primary cause for the protests. A popular fear of growing Chinese economic influence in the country might have been one of the reasons. Eventually, the government eventually suspended the adoption of the process.

Beijing has been anxiously trying to improve its image in Kazakhstan. Think-tanks have emerged on the Chinese side of the border, Kazakh students have been sponsored to travel and study in China[18] and six Confucius institutes have opened throughout the country to date. At a time when tensions are simmering as a result of the detention of Kazakhs in Xinjiang,[20] it looks highly unlikely. Kazakhs seem to waver between enthusiasm on the one hand and deep-seated reluctance on the other.

Unlike some of the other smaller Central Asia countries, Kazakhstan can afford to play a different card towards China and Russia as it balances its relationships with both powers. Data are drawn from a face-to-face survey conducted by the Institute of World Economics and Politics in July among respondents. The survey, led by scholar Serik Beissembayev covered urban and rural communities in all 14 basic administrative units oblast and two cities of national level Almaty and Astana in Kazakhstan.

The situation regarding foreign direct investments is identical. It appears the local populations want Kazakhstan to maintain strong relations with the West, as opposed to becoming a hub for Chinese projects under the BRI umbrella. As in many other Asian countries, citizens see China as a predator rather than a partner. Asked to rank countries that will be important to Kazakhstan in 10 years on a scale from 1 to 4 most important to least important , The United States faired even better with Only 2.

Chinese investments are welcome by Kazakhstan, but the government needs to take into account public perceptions — including by a portion of traditional Kazakh elites. Protesters came out in solidarity in half a dozen other cities, including the capital Nursultan formerly known as Astana and second city Almaty. More grievances were gradually added to the list: protesters complained that Chinese immigrants were taking all the jobs, that Chinese enterprises were polluting the environment and buying up land, that the Chinese authorities were persecuting Kazakhs in Xinjiang, and that the Kazakh authorities were turning a blind eye to all of this in exchange for investment and bribes.

No arrests were made. But a rally on September 21 organized by the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party—which is banned as an extremist group there and whose leader, Mukhtar Ablyazov, lives in France—was broken up by police, with people arrested across eight cities. Zhanaozen, where the information first spread, is plagued by unemployment, and the potential for protest there was already tragically clear: it was there that striking oil workers were shot dead in Theories circulated as to who might have initiated the spreading of the false information, but what really matters is why it led to such serious consequences.

The rallies simply showed that anti-Chinese sentiment can be used by different forces for their own political purposes. When the protests broke out, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry said that the Chinese side was only supplying new technology and investment, and that the projects would create 20, new jobs for Kazakh people.

Those that have been realized include projects in which the Chinese simply bought a stake in Kazakh companies, which certainly would not necessarily create new jobs. Another source of concern in Kazakh society is trade with China: specifically, the high level of corruption involved and machinations over documents at the border. This is the highest in the region in absolute terms, but as a proportion of GDP it is nearly 10 percent lower than any other country in Central Asia, at just 6.

Other worries concern labor migrants, though official statistics show there is no real threat. In , 43 percent of all foreign workers in Kazakhstan came from China, but that was just 12, people: just over half of the quota for Chinese workers, which is set at 23, The issue of giving land to the Chinese for temporary or permanent use elicits strong feelings in Kazakh society, and was the cause of large protests in , when the government had planned to change the law to simplify the process for foreigners to rent land.

The protests forced then Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev to put a moratorium on changing the land laws until His successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has not yet said whether he will extend the moratorium, but he has promised on more than one occasion that he will not give Kazakh land away to foreigners.

Many Kazakhs have come to the conclusion that the Chinese see all Muslims and Turkic people as nothing more than a source of terrorism and extremism. Kazakhstan has sought at times recently to separate itself with Russia, accelerating plans to replace the Cyrillic alphabet and distancing itself from Moscow's annexation of Crimea. But Astana could perhaps get Russia's attention by working to breath more life into the Eurasian union. Its initiative last year to put bloc monitors at the China-Kyrgyzstan border to screen imports was a sign of commitment and could be followed up.

President Donald Trump in January, the possibility of significant new American investment or even interest seems remote in the near term. There are just too many other higher priorities for the current administration.

Astana's best prospects of counterbalancing China without overreliance on Moscow probably lie with the EU. With Kazakh input, Brussels is a developing a new overarching policy strategy for its relations with Central Asia for release this year or next.

It is also working on plans for improved transport and infrastructure links. The EU's scientific research center is also exploring the idea of linking the power grids of Europe and China, a project that would cross through Kazakhstan.

While the prospect of additional pipelines to Europe now seems remote, the continent could easily take more oil from Kazakhstan. Astana could also look to the EU for more support for its broad privatization program, which could potentially be attractive to a range of European investors.

Europe, which now hosts about 5, Kazakh students, could also look to expand its educational links with the country. Astana needs to embrace these openings to deepen the EU's stake in Kazakhstan's future. Ultimately most Kazakhs will feel comfortable with the BRI and all it brings from China, only if the country becomes a truly international platform with the EU, in particular, establishing a bigger presence.

For Kazakhstan, engaging in a deeper partnership with Brussels could help secure its political and economic autonomy. This article was originally published in Nikkei Asian Review. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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